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Abstract 
 
There exists a significant amount of disputation surrounding both the legitimacy and etiology of 
dissociative identity disorder (DID); two separate conflicts that are not mutually exclusive. It is 
unclear whether DID should be considered a valid diagnosis, stemming from questions about the 
reliability of the diagnostic criteria included in the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychological Association, and from the debate 
between etiological hypotheses. Specifically, the post-traumatic model and the sociocognitive 
model proffer separate etiological explanations that are often interpreted as mutually exclusive 
and that have implications for the current conceptualization of DID as a legitimate or valid 
mental disorder. The current review explores the debates associated with this disorder and 
suggests that defining a reliable DID syndrome is necessary for claiming legitimacy and that 
future research on the disorder could be hindered by necessarily assuming that the proposed 
etiological hypotheses are mutually exclusive.  
 
The Legitimacy and Etiology of Dissociative Identity Disorder 
 
A significant amount of controversy has surrounded the legitimacy of a diagnosis of 
dissociative identity disorder (DID – previously known as multiple personality disorder, MPD), 
particularly within the framework of disagreements on the disorders etiology. Several models 
exist to explain the development of DID, including the post-traumatic model (PTM) and the 
sociocognitive model (SCM). The PTM suggests that DID develops as a reactionary defense 
mechanism after exposure to a traumatic experience and can include multiple identities that have 
differential access to memories (Gleaves, 1996). The SCM, on the other hand, posits that DID 
develops as a result of influences from the media and therapist expectations or demands (Spanos, 
1994). The models and their purported supporting evidence will be further discussed below; 
however, it is first necessary to establish the syndrome of DID as a specific, differentiable 
disorder. 
Largely in response to the uncertainty and disputation about how DID develops, the 
legitimacy of DID as a diagnosis has come into question. This is because if the SCM is true, it 
has implications for the effectiveness and potential negative outcomes of treatment. If DID arises 
through elicitation by the therapist, the disorder seems less “real”, or less authentic. However, if 
this model is accurate, does that necessarily make DID illegitimate as a diagnosis? The DSM 
provides descriptions of symptomology for the use of differential diagnosis; it does not imply 
specific etiology. If DID presents as a particular set of symptoms, it is therefore classifiable and 
diagnosable. Additionally, it is undeniable that these individuals often exhibit distress and 
impairment in their everyday lives as alters intrude on their cognitive and behavioral processes. 
It clearly remains necessary to continue research in determining the etiology of DID to inform 
appropriate treatment options; however, the legitimacy of DID as a diagnosis covers more than 
etiology. 
 
Phenomenology of Dissociative Identity Disorder 
 
The DSM-IV-TR lists DID under the section of Dissociative Disorders and describes it as 
having “the presence of two or more distinct identities or personality states” characterized by “an 
inability to recall important personal information… too great to be explained by ordinary 
forgetfulness” (APA, 2000, p. 526). This description illustrates the phenomenology commonly 
associated with DID. The multiple identities characteristic of the disorder are commonly called 
alters. Although the DSM-IV-TR also describes the alters as a fragmentation of identity, it is 
often colloquially thought of as a production of separate, complete personalities. However, more 
commonly, the host appears affectively flat while the alters show a specific exaggerated mood, 
none of which individually seem to constitute a well-rounded personality (Humphrey & Dennett, 
1989). Additionally, in concordance with the specific exaggerated emotion, each alter appears 
well suited to deal with a particular set of social experiences. This is more consistent with DID 
presenting as a fragmentation of identity. However, the patients seem convinced that the alters 
constitute separate selves, rather than acting roles, and insist on such (Humphrey & Dennett, 
1989). They are similarly capable of convincing others, particularly their therapists, that the 
alters are truly non-acted, separate personalities.  
In addition to the diagnostic criteria included in the DSM-IV-TR, there are a number of other 
characteristic features present in individuals with DID. Dissociative disorders in general can 
exhibit dissociative features in multiple functions of consciousness, including the perception of 
the self and the environment, the experience of identity, and memory (Gast, 2006). DID is 
thought to be the most serious dissociative disorder and displays dissociative features in all three 
categories. More specifically, a reliable DID syndrome has been found to include thirteen 
different dissociative symptoms cohesively termed the subjective/phenomenological model: 
amnesia, conversion symptoms, voices, depersonalization, trance states, self-alteration, 
derealization, awareness of the presence of other personalities, identity confusion, flashbacks, 
psychotic-like dissociative symptoms, auditory hallucinations, visual hallucinations and 
Schneiderian first-rank symptoms (Dell, 2006). The DSM arguably describes only two of these 
symptoms, amnesia and the presence of other personalities. Therefore, it appears that the DSM 
narrowly views DID as an alter disorder when it is truly characterized by a number of other 
descriptive symptoms that should be taken into account in the phenomenological picture of DID. 
 
 
 
Dissociative Identity Disorder as a Valid Diagnosis 
 
Whether using the description of DID provided by the DSM or by the 
subjective/phenomenological model, a syndrome characteristic of DID appears to truly exist and 
be reliably found, at least in North American populations. Additionally, there are a number of 
factors that are thought to increase the diagnostic validity of the disorder (Gleaves & May, 
2001). These factors include a sufficient amount of existing academic literature on DID, a 
systematized diagnostic criteria, reliability in diagnosis with instruments such as structured 
interviews and self-report measures, a syndrome of co-occurring symptoms, and differentiation 
from other mental disorders. However, others have disagreed on this latter point, suggesting that 
DID can be confused with a number of other mental disorders, including other dissociative 
disorders, schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder and temporal lobe epilepsy (Osei, 
2004). This is not surprising, considering a number of features characteristic of DID are found in 
other mental disorders. For example, auditory and visual hallucinations and Schneiderian first-
rank symptoms are often found in patients with schizophrenia. Flashbacks, depersonalization and 
derealization can be found in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  
While it is not abnormal for core symptoms of a mental disorder to be present in others, such 
as anxious or depressive features, this overlapping of characteristics may support the 
development of a more inclusive diagnostic criteria for DID, such as with the 
subjective/phenomenological model. Alternatively, a diathesis-stress model suggests that DID 
could be a complex form of PTSD given that both are often conceptualized as responding to a 
traumatic event (Gast, 2006). In the case of DID, the traumatization occurs during childhood, a 
time where development of an integrative self is still occurring and is therefore disrupted, 
leading to the development of a fragmented identity, along with the other dissociative features 
often found with PTSD. This explanation is characteristic of the post-traumatic model of DID, 
which will be discussed in further detail below. For the moment, it is important to note that this 
theory suggests that rather than altering the current categorical diagnostic criteria for DID, it 
would be more beneficial to conceptualize dissociation as a dimension with DID being a more 
extreme dimensional form of PTSD. Similarly, DID has been posited to represent a personality 
disorder along a continuum of repression and splitting features, related to both borderline and 
narcissistic personality disorder (Fahy, 1988). 
These inconsistencies in diagnostic suggestions for DID illustrate that it is not completely 
formed as a valid diagnosis, though it shows an obvious existence as a syndrome. It is clear that 
the phenomenon of DID exists and that these individuals show distress and impairment that 
would benefit from psychological treatment (Humphrey & Dennet, 1989). However, the specific 
etiology of DID also remains unclear and disputed. Understanding how the dissociative 
symptoms develop may not only be helpful in describing the disorder as a whole, but also in 
informing how its treatment should be framed. 
 
 
Inter-Identity Variances 
 
As one of the core features of DID mentioned in the DSM, the development and maintenance 
of alters is of particular interest. The development of alters is associated with etiology of the 
disorder, and so understanding the characteristics of how they exist and function could inform 
various etiological hypothesis. One line of research focuses on investigating the observable 
differences between the reported alters to both legitimize their existence as separate selves and to 
determine their functional use. This research involves the study of differences in memory and 
other physiological measurements between alters. The current review attempts to show a 
representative rather than an exhaustive discussion of such research.  
 
Inter-Identity Amnesia 
 
There are several different forms of inter-identity amnesia reported by DID patients that 
differ in directionality of forgetfulness (Eich, Macaulay, Loewenstein, & Dihle, 1997). This 
discussion of alters will restrict descriptions to comparisons between two alters, designated 
Identity A and B. These identities can be mutually amnesic or mutually cognizant of each other. 
Alternatively, two identities may show one-way amnesia, which will currently be described as 
Identity A being amnesic for B while Identity B is cognizant of A. A number of experiments 
have investigated inter-identity amnesia for explicit knowledge, such as episodic memory, versus 
implicit knowledge, such as procedure skills; however, results are largely mixed (Peters, 
Uyterlinde, Consemulder, & van der Hart, 1998; Huntjens, Peters, Woertman, van der Hart, & 
Postma, 2007; Huntjens, Postma, Peters, Woertman, & van der Hart, 2003, Huntjens, Postma, 
Woertman, van der Hart, & Peters, 2005). These inconclusive results are further complicated by 
the fact that not all experiments utilize a simulating control group in which normal participants 
are instructed to mimic the features of DID, acting as a separate alter for specific parts of the 
experiment. However, the interpretation of simulating control group results itself is controversial, 
considering the idea of manifesting alters as “role-playing” in DID may be qualitatively different 
from controls pretending to have the disorder. Additionally, these experiments largely utilize a 
population of DID patients that are able to switch to an alter on command either freely or during 
hypnosis. This may only reflect a sub-population of DID patients, which may be a particularly 
important distinction if DID can be developed in multiple ways, as will be discussed below.  
Experiments using explicit memory tasks exhibit mixed results. For example, a study using 
one-way amnesic DID patients showed transfer of explicit information about emotionally neutral 
stimuli from Identity A to B, but not from Identity B to A (Peters et al., 1998). This is consistent 
with one-way amnesia for explicit information, though no simulator control group was used as 
comparison. Additionally, one patient in this study showed some transfer of explicit information 
from Identity B to A on a free recall test, suggesting some leakage of explicit information. 
Several studies using an interference paradigm have shown in-tact memory in recall and 
recognition tests in DID patients, contrary to reported one-way amnesia (Huntjens et al., 2007; 
Huntjens et al., 2003). In this task, word list A is shown to Identity A and word list B is shown to 
Identity B. Each identity is then later tested for intrusion of words from the list given to the other 
identity in recall and recognition of the words from their own list. Patients did show intrusions 
for negative, positive and neutral words, conflicting with the reported subjective amnesia. 
Additionally, when asked to characterize words in the recognition test as known or remembered, 
DID patients showed no difference in response for recognizing words learned in the two different 
identities. This suggests that they do not experience recognizing words learned in separate 
identities differently, such as recollecting an event experience by a different identity as if 
watching from a third person perspective.  
On the other hand, there are studies that support exhibition of amnesia for explicit 
information learned in another identity differently from simulators. One experiment studied 
performance of DID patients, simulators and guessers, the latter being naïve to all study material 
at test (Huntjens et al., 2006). On a recall test, the patient’s exhibited no knowledge of the story 
learned in another identity. However, on a multiple choice recognition test, the guessers showed 
chance level performance while the patients and simulators showed below chance performance, 
suggesting they used knowledge of correct answers to choose the incorrect answers. 
Interestingly, the simulators and patients showed different strategies in choosing incorrect 
answers from the multiple choices, the former choosing more implausible answers. Overall, the 
results from explicit memory tasks suggest that DID patients do not show strict amnesia as is 
subjectively reported, but instead exhibit a leakage of information between identities. However, 
patients still show differences in performance from simulators, such as strategy of exhibiting 
amnesia, that suggest they are not simply acting or pretending to not remember information from 
other identities.  
While procedural memory is normally thought to transfer across alters implicitly, this result 
is not always found. For example, one experiment investigated performance of DID patients, 
simulators and normal controls on Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task (Huntjens et al., 2005). In 
this task multiple blocks are given to a participant in which they parrot a presented finger 
pressing sequence that is either random or repeated within the block. Normal controls show a 
decreased reaction time with repeating sequence blocks as they implicitly learn the procedural 
skill and a subsequent increase in reaction time when switched to a random block. Both patients 
and simulators showed a pattern consistent with inter-identity amnesia with a decrease in 
reaction time during a subsequent repeating block after a switch to a new identity. The patient’s 
results are therefore ambiguous as to whether they exhibit true inter-identity amnesia or a 
simulation of it. 
Alternatively, another study found an intact affective priming effect in DID patients, 
consistent with functional implicit processing of conditioned responses (Huntjens, Peters, et al., 
2005). In this study, patients were shown pairs of neutral words that were previously associated 
with either positive or negative, trauma-related words. Like normal controls, patients show faster 
response times to the target word when the neutral words were previously paired with congruent 
affective words (negative and negative, or positive and positive) versus incongruent affective 
words (negative and positive). This suggests intact transfer of the affective associations made 
with one identity to the testing performance of another identity. The transfer of implicit 
information across identities, as with explicit information, shows mixed result; however, implicit 
memories are commonly thought of as more transferable between identities than explicit 
memories.  
Importantly, there may be a difference in the transfer of implicit information with tasks that 
vary in amount of data-driven processing. One experiment administered a word stem completion 
task and a picture-fragment completion task to DID individuals (Eich et al., 1997). One identity 
was asked to rate a list of words that was meant to prime answers for a word-stem completion 
task in the second identity. Additionally, one identity was administered a picture-fragment 
completion task, in which progressive pictures with more detail are given until object 
identification, that was meant to prime faster identification of the same objects in the second 
identity. DID patients showed no inter-identity priming for the stem-completion task but showed 
evidence of priming in the picture-fragment task. This might reflect the fact that the word-stem 
completion task allows for multiple responses where differing interpretive processes of identities 
may operate. The picture-fragment task, on the other hand, requires more data-driven processes 
and only one specific answer. Leaking across identities may therefore be better characterized as 
dependent on the extent to which varying inter-identity processes can operate on the encoding 
and retrieval of a particular type of memory, as opposed to dependent on whether the memory is 
explicit versus implicit per se.  
In sum, there appears to be a disconnection between what patients subjectively report as strict 
amnesia, and what is often found to be either leaky amnesia or a lack of it completely. It has 
been suggested that amnesia found in DID patients may be related to a dysfunction in meta-
memory as opposed to actual memory (Kindt & van den Hout, 2003). One study showed 
participants aversive fragments of a film that included sexual and physical violence to induce 
state dissociation (which is separate from trait dissociation). There was no correlation between 
state dissociation scores and actual memory, measured by a sequential memory task where they 
were asked to place clips in the originally presented order. However, there was a significant 
correlation between state dissociation and meta-memory, measured by asking for the subjective 
characteristic of their film recollections. Dissociation after watching an aversive film was 
therefore related to the subjective experience of memory fragmentation as opposed to actual 
fragmentation of memory performance. 
These memory studies suggest that dissociation could be related to alterations in meta-
memory as opposed to actual memory accuracy, another important distinction beyond simply 
distinguishing explicit from implicit memory. This idea is consistent with the fact that while 
patients subjectively report inter-identity amnesia, a meta-memory process, the memories may, 
in fact, be accessible across identities. Additionally, the amount of data-driven versus 
conceptually-driven processing may influence the amount of leakage occurring across identities, 
considering that separate alters may exhibit varying conceptual schemas. Notably, this may be 
reflected in the fact that explicit memory is more conceptually-driven than implicit memory, the 
latter showing more leakage across identities.  
 
Inter-Identity Physiological Differences 
 
A number of experiments have also aimed to determine the physiological differences 
between identities. Not only are there behavioral reports of memory loss, but a specific neural 
system is thought to be involved in purposeful forgetting or memory suppression (Anderson et 
al., 2004). During a think/no-think task, participants were presented with one member of a pair 
and asked to either suppress or recall the associated member. It appears that activation of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and deactivation of the hippocampus was associated with 
suppressing the unwanted memories and, importantly, with their subsequent impaired 
maintenance. While this active suppression may mimic simulator participant’s processes more 
closely than those of patients, it would still be informative to determine whether there were 
differences in brain activation of this neural system in DID patients that show one-way amnesia. 
Does the suppression, or repression, of memories from Identity B by Identity A show activation 
of similar brain areas? 
A large portion of the studies investigating differences in cerebral blood flow have looked at 
reactions to neutral or trauma-related scripts in varying identities. These studies often designate 
two separate identities, one as a neutral-identity state, and one as a traumatic identity state, the 
latter of which is thought to be fixated on and reactive to the experienced trauma. Multiple 
experiments have found differential cerebral activation to the two scripts across identities that 
suggest differential processing of the two scripts in the neutral versus trauma identity state 
(Reinders et al., 2006; Reinders, Willemsen, Vos, den Boer, & Nijenhuis, 2012). When 
compared to previous research exploring self versus non-self memory retrieval, the neutral 
identity appears to process the trauma-related script in a non-biographical manner, consistent 
with the idea that this identity dissociates to a trauma identity in order to not directly experience 
the traumatic event. In a similar experiment, it was suggested that simulating controls did not 
satisfactorily replicate the neural differences found between identities in DID patients (Reinders 
et al., 2012). However, it may not be surprising that simulators create alters for themselves 
differently from DID patients. This is consistent with the fact that patients seem to truly believe 
in the existence of the alters, and also the finding described above in which these groups show 
different strategies in exhibiting amnesia.  
There are a number of anecdotal reports on the differences between alters of the same 
individual. These include changes in posture, handwriting, mannerisms, voice patterns, allergic 
reaction and responsivity to alcohol and sedatives (Humphrey & Dennett, 1989). A number of 
these are consistent with physiological alterations between identities. Similarly, experiments 
have also shown variations in responses to neutral versus trauma-related scripts in cardiovascular 
response (Reinders et al., 2006). However, these physiological results may be explained by a 
change in the level of subject arousal during separate alter presentations (Fahy, 1988). Viewed in 
this way, it may not be surprising that different alters exhibit changes in heart rate or neural 
activity. Additionally, these variations could lead to the psychological experimental results on 
memory described in the previous section. Differences in memories across identities could occur 
through state-dependent learning, in which bodily state during encoding and retrieval affect the 
ability to remember a memory (Fahy, 1988). This is consistent with the finding that a data-driven 
task is less susceptible to inter-identity amnesia because it may be less influenced by state-
dependent factors. Additionally, differences in level of arousal between identities may serve as 
the state-dependent distinction.  
In sum, differences can readily be found between alters with psychological and physiological 
tests. These separate selves are convincingly so and constitute a core symptom in the syndrome 
of DID. However, the split between alters is clearly not complete, often exhibiting leakage of 
information. It is likely that in the development of alters, meta-memory, rather than actual 
memory per se, is affected, leading to a subjective amnesia between identities. Fully identifying 
the characteristics of how patients differentiate the alters could be useful for informing treatment 
of DID. Additionally, the way in which these alters are developed, which is inevitably related to 
the characteristic of the splitting, would similarly be informative. However, there is disagreement 
about the etiology of DID, largely divided into two camps: supporters of the post-traumatic 
model and those of the sociocognitive model.  
 
Etiological Models for Dissociative Identity Disorder 
 
Many proponents of the post-traumatic model (PTM) and the sociocognitive model (SCM) of 
DID dispute each other’s model as if they were mutually exclusive. This is evident in a series of 
articles responding to and disagreeing or even arguing with each other (Spanos, 1994; Gleaves, 
1996; Lilienfeld et al., 1999). However, as we will see, not all components of these models are 
mutually exclusive, nor is it necessary for there to be a single explanation for the phenomenology 
exhibited by DID patients. 
 
Post-Traumatic Model 
 
The PTM suggests that individuals who experience a traumatic event compartmentalize these 
experiences into alters as a defense mechanism for coping with the emotional and physical pain 
of the trauma (Gleaves, 1996). This model is consistent with the previously mentioned theory 
that DID can be conceptualized as a form of PTSD. It is also consistent with the phenomenon 
that people who experience a stressful event can exhibit subsequent amnesia for it. For example, 
a person who commits a violent murder sometimes report going into a “craze” and not 
remembering committing the murder (Gleaves, 1996). Perhaps an individual who experiences 
childhood abuse exhibits the same phenomenon during traumatic events, which then becomes a 
patterned or entrained mechanism to deal with the environment, which often involves repeated 
traumas, that develops into the syndrome of DID. 
 
Sociocognitive Model 
 
The SCM, on the other hand, states that alters develop through patient role-enactment that 
appears governed by rules and goal-directed (Spanos, 1994). The alters are therefore elicited, 
crystalized and preserved by social reinforcement, largely within the context of therapy. Rather 
than occurring through conscious deception, the role-enactment is thought to occur 
spontaneously in suggestible individuals without conscious intent (Lilienfeld et al, 1999). The 
surrounding culture is thought to influence the expectations of how DID is manifested. For 
example, in India changes between alters often follows a period of sleep, which is the common 
presentation of DID in the movie culture of the country (Spanos, 1994).  
We already act differently in different situations, which may show extreme variations in 
response to stressors. During therapy, certain suggestible individuals are thought to crystalize 
these differences into alters in response to suggestions from the therapist (Lilienfeld et al., 1999). 
This model emphasizes the importance of therapy in the actual development and maintenance of 
the alters, particularly when using hypnosis and other leading techniques. The therapist is 
thought to implicitly supply demand characteristics for DID symptoms, which patients then 
respond to appropriately.  
In comparing the PTM and the SCM, it is useful to view them in the framework of how DID 
shows variations across history and across cultures. The influence of iatrogenic factors, or 
negative outcomes of therapy, on alter creation and the link between childhood abuse and DID 
are also important in distinguishing, as well as synthesizing, the different models.  
 
Variations in the Expression of Dissociative Symptoms 
 
The expression of dissociative symptoms show differences both throughout history and 
across cultures. While this does not necessary rule out the PTM as an explanation, it is highly 
consistent with the SCM. 
 
A Brief History of Dissociative Identity Disorder 
 
There has been an exponentially increasing number of reported DID cases throughout recent 
history. The first purported case of DID was reported in 1816, after which several cases in the 
late 19th century led to a lengthy published discussion between several authors (Merskey, 1992). 
After this, the number of cases reported showed surges after the publication of books on the 
disorder, such as The Three Faces of Eve in 1957 and Sybil in 1973. Additionally, after multiple 
personality disorder (MPD) was established as a category in the DSM-III in 1980, the number of 
cases increases. The surge of reported cases is illustrated by the fact that their number changed 
from 79 in 1970 to about 6,000 in 1986 to the tens of thousands by the end of the 20th century 
(Lilienfeld et al., 1999). This exponential increase in the number of cases could potentially be 
consistent with both the PTM and the SCM. It appears to indicate that as the surrounding culture 
becomes more specified and vocal about the disorder, the number of cases increases as a 
response to culture expectations. However, it could also be consistent with the fact that an 
increased awareness of the disorder could lead to more accurate diagnoses of patients. 
Of particular note was the proliferation of public knowledge about DID after the publication 
of the book Sybil, by Flora Schreiber, and its subsequent movie production. This movie appears 
to have precipitated not only a surge in DID diagnoses but also an explanation of the disorder as 
causally linked to childhood abuse, which is largely highlighted in the movie (Lynn & Deming, 
2010). Interestingly, while the book was based on an actual patient, Sybil was later evaluated to 
be highly suggestible and thought to have contrived the multiple identities to satisfy her 
therapist, who held an inappropriately close relationship with her client. This appears more 
consistent with the SCM, which suggests clients may create alters to please the therapist, whether 
conscious or not. Additionally, the increase in reports of childhood abuse linked to DID is not as 
convincingly explained by the PTM; although it could still be argued that increased awareness 
led to uncovering an actual, pre-existing link. Similarly, recently the number of abuse cases 
involving satanic ritual abuse has markedly increased (Vogelsang, 2010). However, over years of 
investigation, federal law enforcement has continually been unsuccessful in uncovering 
underground satanic groups of a size that would account for the amount of satanic abuse 
currently reported by DID patients. Together with the fact that increased rates of other childhood 
reported traumas are not always corroborated, this suggests that the expression of DID has 
altered as a response to historical expectations. 
The earliest descriptions of DID cases do not appear to reflect the current syndrome normally 
associated with DID patients. Instead, many of these cases showed evidence of organic disease, 
brain damage, and epilepsy, or more closely resembled fugues, somnambulistic states, hypnotic 
induction or bipolar disorder (BPD; Merskey, 1992). These cases were a large portion of the 
principal 19th century cases that initiated the developing interest in DID. In examination of cases 
after the turn of the 20th century, it is suggested that no case has been found to undoubtedly 
emerge unconsciously and without influence from the popular media, particularly after the 
popularization of The Three Faces of Eve and Sybil. This suggests that DID developed as a 
historically new syndrome from a misinterpretation of other disorders in early reported cases. 
Subsequently, the assumption of knowledge of DID as a syndrome led to a proliferation of cases 
that responded to expectations from these assumptions and developed into the current picture of 
DID.  
Consistent with this idea, the expression of dissociative and somatoform disorders has 
changed with passing history as expectation have changed for prevailing characteristics of the 
disorders. During the 19th century, sudden somatic symptoms were common relative to previous 
historical rates, which was then replaced by fainting spells, also known as the vapors (Lilienfeld 
et al., 1999). At the end of the 19th century, conversion disorders were relatively common and 
may have been subsequently replaces by DID as the “in season” disorder. Therefore, dissociative 
symptoms appear to traverse historical contexts under the name of what is thought to be popular 
and appropriate at the time. Viewing this disorder within a historical context appears most 
consistent with the SCM, which is developed under the assumption that cultural context 
influences the expression of what we now call DID. 
 
Dissociative Identity Disorder across Cultures 
 
Similar to influences of historical context, dissociative symptoms appear to traverse cultures 
and be expressed in ways found appropriate by the surrounding society. These expressions can 
range from DID, demonic possession, and mass hysteria to glossolalia (Spanos, 1994). 
Additionally, DID itself exhibits different rates of prevalence across varying cultures. The 
proliferation previously discusses occurred largely in North American, whereas a number of 
other countries continue to exhibit a dearth of cases, such as in Japan, France, England, India and 
Russia (Merskey, 1992). However, it has also been reported that DID can be found in a variety of 
countries, including the United States, China, Turkey and Australia (Ross, 2006).  
The idea that culture can influence the exhibition of a mental disorder is not new; several 
“culture-bound syndromes” are acknowledged. For example, taijin-kyofusho, or the fear of 
offending others particularly with one’s own body odor, primarily occurs in Japan. Therefore, it 
seems to reason that culture could influence the particular fashion in which a dissociative state is 
both explained and exhibited. A wide variety of states have been described that suggest 
dissociation as a common trait colored by the particular culture (Somer, 2006). Kinetically 
induced dissociation occurs with rhythmic music and dance, often used to promote well-being 
and relieve distress, particularly in African indigenous communities. Kinetically associated 
dissociation is also found in a variety of religions to express devoutness and commune with the 
Creator, such as with torso-rocking movements in Jewish prayer. Additionally, trances are often 
explained as possession by a spiritual being or deity. Interestingly, this possession can range 
from socially sanctioned, positive deity possession to unsanctioned, negative demonic 
possession. It is thought that these dissociative states can have ameliorative characteristics 
through self-hypnotic analgesia and the cathartic expression of unsanctioned thoughts or 
behaviors, such as outbursts from females in strict, patriarchal societies.  
The SCM suggests that dissociative symptoms are enacted through a cultural context of what 
is considered appropriate. The variations in expressing dissociative symptoms and the 
differences in DID rates across cultures is therefore consistent with the SCM. However, it is also 
important to note that these observations do not necessarily rule out the PTM, which states that 
the variation in DID rates across cultures could be due to a difference in the ability to diagnose 
DID because of diverse levels of understanding and acknowledgement it. In North America, 
where DID is highly prevalent in comparison to other cultures, the SCM suggests that therapists 
play a major role in the cultural formulation of dissociative symptoms in DID. 
 
 
 
Iatrogenic Influences on Dissociative Identity Disorder 
 
Iatrogenic effects refer to negative outcomes resulting from treatment or diagnosis, in this 
case of DID (Bootzin & Bailey, 2005). In the SCM, therapists that use suggestive techniques, 
often involving hypnosis, are thought to cause such effects by eliciting the development of alters 
that were not previously manifested. This ability to influence symptom expression in patients is 
thought to be related to suggestibility, absorption and fantasy proneness. 
 
Suggestive Therapy and Hypnosis 
 
It has been noted that a significant portion of DID diagnoses are reported by a small number 
of therapists, whereas others report encountering no cases at all (Merskey, 1992). Proponents of 
the SCM suggest that this reflects the influence of therapist expectations on the outcomes of 
patients’ symptom expressions. Supporters of the PTM, on the other hand, state that this occurs 
because particular therapists are aware and knowledgeable about the disorder, and so are able to 
elicit alters that were previously established after a traumatic event during childhood.  
During the treatment of DID, therapists may tend to ask leading questions that can influence 
suggestive individuals into creating alters to assume the role being elicited. Such leading 
questions include statements such as “do you ever feel as if you are not alone, as if there is 
someone else or some other part watching you?”, “everybody listen”, and instructions that “there 
will be a chair for every personality in the system” (Lilienfeld et al., 1999). These leading 
questions are particularly influential during hypnotic interviewing, which is often used to elicit 
alters. Guided imagery is another therapeutic technique that could potentially elicit the creation 
of alters, such as with hypnosis (Lilienfeld et al., 1999). It is quite easy to see how therapists who 
support the PTM would be more likely to generate alters in this way during treatment than those 
who support the SCM.  
Hypnosis is a common therapeutic technique used by therapists to elicit alters in patients who 
they believe to have DID. The leading questions previously described often occur during 
hypnotic interviewing. Additionally, both during treatment and at the time of diagnosis, DID 
patients that were hypnotized during therapy show a greater variance in their number of alters 
than those who were not (Lilienfeld et al., 1999). Hypnosis has also been found to elicit different 
personalities in normal individuals, such as during age-regression to previous life times (Fahy, 
1988). However, these personalities tend to be less complex than those exhibited by DID patients 
and are transitory, though the long-term effects of such hypnosis are unknown. Also, while 
hypnosis has not been shown to increase memory accuracy, it may instead increase the 
confidence one has in false memories, which may lead to an increase in reporting false memories 
of abuse. It is clearly important to understand the etiological factors of DID to inform therapy 
and prevent what could be considered an unethical worsening or maintenance of symptoms. 
 
 
Hypnotic Ability, Absorption and Fantasy Proneness 
 
Associations have been found between DID and hypnotic ability, absorption and fantasy 
proneness. High scores on the dissociative experiences survey (DES) were associated with high 
levels of normal involvement of the imagination, such as with fantasy proneness, absorption and 
daydream immersion (Levin & Spei, 2004). Additionally, DID patients exhibit higher 
hypnotizability scores than normal individuals, as well as patients with schizophrenia, mood 
disorders, or anxiety disorders (Frischholz, Lipman, Braun, & Sachs, 1992). This may suggest 
that assessment of hypnotizability could be helpful in differentially diagnosing dissociative 
patients. It may also suggest that individuals who are highly hypnotizable, and therefore highly 
suggestible, are more likely to be influenced by the leading questions from therapists described 
above, precipitating the development of DID features.  
There are also individuals who report difficulties in distinguishing between dreams and 
reality, which may lead to the creation of false memories (Rassin, Merckelbach, & Spaan, 2001). 
Interestingly, these individuals also tend to exhibit high scores in measures of fantasy proneness 
and dissociation. This has implications for the ability of people who score highly on these 
measures, such as individuals with DID, to easily create false memories, such as of traumatic 
events like child abuse. Consistent with this idea, dissociation is found to show a propensity for 
false memories, which raises questions about the accuracy of reported traumatic memories 
(Lynn, Lilienfeld, Merckelbach, Giesrecht, & van der Kloet, 2012). Consistent with this, 
memories of events prior to age 1 are thought to not exist and those prior to age 3 are said to 
exhibit questionable validity (Lilienfeld et al., 1999). There are cases in which DID patients 
report memories for abuse or for the emergence of alters during these ages, which may reflect 
such false memory production. 
However, it remains possible that the connections between propensities for dissociation, 
fantasy proneness, hypnotizability and false memories could exaggerate the already existing link 
between trauma and DID. Trauma may also lead to characteristics such as fantasy proneness that 
lead to highly suggestible individuals that are then more susceptible to developing DID through 
iatrogenic factors. Clearly, there are a variety of explanations that need not exclusively focus on 
the PTM versus the SCM. It is possible that both models describe processes through which DID 
could develop or that they, in fact, interact with each other. As another example, self-hypnosis 
refers to the automatic ability to place the self into a trance, which can be trained by a hypnotist, 
but may also exist as a natural ability in certain individuals (Fahy, 1988). If these individuals are 
exposed to extremely stressful events, such as sexual abuse, the use of self-hypnosis may lead to 
the development of DID features.  
 
Childhood Abuse 
 
A major controversy between the PTM and SCM model is the validity of childhood abuse 
reports from DID patients. The SCM model calls these reports into question because of the 
recent surge in their occurrence and in the historical change in their content of satanic ritual 
abuse, and because of the described propensity for false memories in these individuals. One 
study claimed to have concretely established the link between DID and traumatic childhood 
abuse (Lewis, Yeager, Swica, Pincus, & Lewis, 1997). In this study, the abuse and the existence 
of dissociative symptoms in childhood for a number of DID patients was corroborated with 
multiple sources. However, these authors used a population of inmates on death row who had 
committed murder, and so may be examining a population that is not generalizable to all DID 
patients and who may be particularly likely to have associated childhood abuse. This study does, 
on the other hand, exemplify the ability to amass evidence that corroborates childhood abuse and 
the existence of dissociative symptoms in those individuals prior to treatment. This technique 
should be used on a much larger scale with a variety of DID patients to more generally determine 
the relationship between childhood abuse and DID. However, as it stands, a concrete link 
between abuse and DID has yet to be seen. 
Again, it is important to note that while the models appear largely divergent on the issue of 
childhood abuse in DID patients, the SCM is not necessarily exclusive about abuse not truly 
having occurred in these individuals (Lilienfeld et al., 1999). It is possible that such events lead 
to a predisposition for qualities such as fantasy proneness or absorption that, as discussed, 
increase an individuals’ susceptibility to suggestion during therapy. Additionally, it is possible 
that during childhood abuse, the perpetrator elicits alters in the victim in a way similar to 
therapeutic suggestion (Humphrey & Dennett, 1989). In these situations, the perpetrator may call 
the victim by a different name during the abusive sessions, which could crystalize an alter during 
a dissociative state, much like how asking for a patient to give the identity a name during therapy 
crystalizes it as a separate self.  
The PTM would be called into question if a large amount of DID cases were found to not 
exhibit a history of childhood abuse (Lilienfeld et al., 1999). However, it is difficult to rule it out 
completely, considering that proponents of this model believe the patients may repress the 
memories of the traumatic event to cope with it. In this case, absence of evidence does not equate 
to evidence of absence. Additionally, the SCM may be undermined by evidence for the existence 
of alters well before the time of therapy. However, as discussed, the cultural influence that 
demands role-enactment does not necessarily have to come from a therapist. It could originate 
from self-expectations after watching the movie Sybil, or even from the perpetrator of childhood 
abuse. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
A syndrome that we currently name DID reliably exists within several populations, 
particularly in North America. However, the current diagnostic criteria may require some 
revisions to increase the disorder’s diagnostic validity. For example, it may be useful to expand 
the criteria to include the characteristics described by the subjective/phenomenological model. 
However, much current research is limited by simply canvasing the existence of particular 
symptoms in DID. While this is necessary in developing reliable criteria for diagnosing the 
disorder, it also limits comparison to other disorders as descriptive of current phenomenology. 
Other methods of studying the connection between DID and other disorders should be explored. 
For example, it should be explored whether DID is better categorized as a complex version of 
PTSD. It could be useful to determine whether trauma during childhood, when integration of the 
self is still developing, can lead to PTSD or only DID. The factors involved in developing one or 
the other could inform whether they represent completely separate disorders or levels of the same 
stress diathesis. Alternatively, it could be useful to determine what disorders may be exhibited by 
patients prior to the development of DID, considering its historical relationship with 
inappropriately diagnosing disorders such as BPD.  
Beyond the changes that could be made to the criteria for DID, the reality of the disorder as 
an existing syndrome is characterized by measurable differences in memory and physiological 
reactions between the manifested alters. The differences in reported memory may be largely 
driven by a deficit in meta-memory in which the patient subjectively believes that the alters 
retain separate memories when, in fact, subconscious access to memories is universal. 
Additionally, the amount of leakage between alters may be largely based on the type of 
processing involved in the memory task. Highly conceptually-driven memories may be easily 
distinguishable between alters because of their varying memory schemas, which are perhaps 
directed by the deficient meta-memory. On the other hand, leakage between alters may be 
difficult to prevent with data-driven memories. This suggests that future research should not be 
limited in broadly comparing explicit and implicit tasks, and should instead include 
investigations of both meta-memory and processing levels involved in memory tasks.  
Additionally, the physiological differences between alters, such as heart rate, may be 
involved in state-dependent memory that dictates when to subjectively experience amnesia. 
Future research may therefore benefit in measuring physiological differences, such as arousal, 
while in the process of completing such memory tasks as discussed above. Alternatively, it 
would be interesting to see whether inter-identity amnesia could be influenced by priming 
arousal levels between alters. While the PTM and the SCM do not necessarily define what the 
psychological or physiological differences between alters should be, the idea that meta-memory 
is highly involved mimics the tenant of SCM that beliefs in how dissociative symptoms should 
be expressed influence how they are actually manifested, in this case as amnesia between alters. 
However, these results are also not necessarily inconsistent with the PTM. In either case, the 
psychological and physiological differences that are found between alters are consistent with 
considering DID as a legitimate diagnosis in terms of its symptoms being truly manifested in 
some way.  
The variations in the expressions of both DID and dissociative symptoms across history and 
cultures are highly consistent with the SCM. However, it does not necessarily rule out the PTM. 
Similarly, reports of childhood abuse have not been concretely linked to DID without a 
possibility of false memory creation. More thorough corroboration of these reports may help to 
better understand the relationship between DID, abuse, and perhaps other factors such as 
hypnotizability, fantasy proneness and absorption. While the development of DID without a 
history of child abuse may rule out a strict interpretation of the PTM, abuse may still be a factor 
in some patients.  
Unfortunately, it appears that there are a variety of issues in attempting to prove or disprove 
either the PTM or the SCM. This may be a reflection of the fact that these models need not be 
mutually exclusive and may actually interact in leading to the development of DID. For example, 
an individual who exhibits a proneness for fantasy or dissociation may come to explain their own 
variant behaviors by developing alters. This development could be exacerbated or instigated 
either by suggestive therapeutic techniques, such as hypnosis, or by a traumatic childhood event. 
While it appears difficult to differentiate between the ways DID develops, it remains important 
for informing therapeutic techniques. DID patients are often ignorant of the other identities prior 
to therapy, and as treatment continues, the number of alters tends to increase (Lilienfeld et al., 
1999). This is explained by the PTM as patients hiding their symptoms prior to treatment and by 
the SCM as being iatrogenically elicited. Clearly, the difference between these explanations 
would influence whether therapists should attempt to elicit alters at all. If hypnosis is used, 
perhaps the therapist should ignore references to third person variants of the self in case this 
leads to crystallization of alters and a full blown manifestation of the DID syndrome. Perhaps 
these etiological hypotheses should be considered in parallel, rather than as mutually exclusive. 
Alternatively, supporters of either model must develop methods that can conclusively 
differentiate between the models, which, as has been described, is largely absent in the literature. 
In light of historical and cultural contextual changes in dissociative symptom expressions, it 
is likely to change again with the proceeding of the current century. It may therefore be more 
beneficial to study the dissociative symptoms individually, focusing on the specific processes 
involved in them, which will inevitably inform the diagnoses that include them, but will also 
remain pertinent with the coming changes. In fact, altering the approach of investigating DID 
would influence the cultural expectations of the disorder and possibly lead to these changes in 
symptom expression. Additionally, investigating the relationship between dissociative symptoms 
and childhood traumas, hypnotizability, fantasy proneness and absorption may help in 
understanding which aspects of the PTM and the SCM are pertinent in the etiology of DID. 
Understanding the role of particular dissociative symptoms, and the influence of other factors on 
those symptoms, will ultimately aid in developing a more concretely legitimate picture of DID as 
a diagnosis.  
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